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Abstract: The status of hypnosis as an altered state of consciousness 
(ASC) has long been controversial. The classic phenomena of hypno-
sis, such as sensory anaesthesias, analgesia, amnesia, and post-
hypnotic suggestion, provide prima facie evidence of altered con-
sciousness, but some theorists contend that these are the products of 
normal mental processes, such as suggestion and expectation. In this 
article, hypnosis is viewed against a general framework for describing 
ASCs in terms of four converging operations: induction procedure, 
subjective experience, behavioural correlates, and physiological 
correlates. Although ‘neutral’ hypnosis, in the absence of specific 
suggestions, has few distinctive characteristics, many of the classic 
phenomena of hypnosis involve dissociations between explicit and 
implicit memory, or perception, such that percepts, memories, and 
thoughts influence ongoing experience, thought, and action outside 
conscious awareness and control. 
1. Introduction 
Hypnosis is a phenomenon in which one person (the hypnotist) offers 
suggestions to another person (the subject) for imaginative experi-
ences entailing alterations in perception, memory, and action. In the 
classic case, these experiences are associated with a degree of sub-
jective conviction bordering on delusion, and an experienced involun-
tariness bordering on compulsion. As such, hypnosis entails altera-
tions in consciousness which take place in the context of a particular 
interpersonal relationship. These alterations in consciousness have 
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made hypnosis an object of interest to researchers and clinicians since 
the time of William James and Jean-Martin Charcot; but the fact that 
these phenomena are instigated by suggestion has made hypnosis an 
object of controversy (Kihlstrom, 2007; 2008b; for comprehensive 
coverage of hypnosis, see Nash and Barnier, 2008). 
Any survey of responses to hypnotic suggestions, such as provided 
by the standardized scales constructed to measure individual differ-
ences in hypnotizability (Hilgard, 1965), makes it obvious that hypno-
sis represents an ASC. In the sensory aneasthesias, subjects cannot 
see, hear, or feel stimuli presented at suprathreshold levels of 
intensity; in analgesia, they may feel a tactile stimulus, but not the 
pain it would normally cause; in the positive hallucinations, they see 
or hear things that are not there; in the negative hallucinations, they 
fail to see or hear things that are there; in agnosia, they cannot identify 
objects that are objectively familiar to them; when age-regressed, 
adults feel like children again; they respond to post-hypnotic 
suggestions without knowing that they are doing so, or why; and, by 
virtue of post-hypnotic amnesia, they cannot remember what trans-
pired while they were hypnotized, until the suggestion has been can-
celled by a prearranged reversibility cue. Even the ideomotor 
suggestions, perhaps the most prosaic of all hypnotic phenomena, 
involve altered consciousness: hypnotized subjects do not just lower 
or fail to bend their outstretched arms — they feel a heavy weight 
pulling their hands and arms down, or their arms held rigidly in place 
by a splint. That these effects do not occur spontaneously (and must 
be suggested to subjects), and they do not occur in all subjects who 
have been hypnotized (by virtue of individual differences in hypno-
tizability, even at the high end), does not gainsay that each of them 
entails an alteration in the subject’s state of consciousness (Kihlstrom, 
1992b; 2005; 2007). 
2. Critiques of State Theory 
Nevertheless, the status of hypnosis as an ASC has long been contro-
versial (for overviews of the controversy, see Barber, 1972; Gruzelier, 
2005; Hilgard, 1973b; Kallio and Revonsuo, 2003; 2005; Kihlstrom, 
1992b; 2005; Kirsch, 2005; Lynn et al., 2007; Mazzoni et al., 2013; 
Oakley, 1999; Sarbin, 1992; Sarbin and Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986; 
Spanos and Chaves, 1970; Wagstaff and Cole, 2005). 
Sometimes the debate has been couched in terms of the validity of 
‘trance’ or ‘special-process’ theories of hypnosis. For example, Barber 
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(1969) argued that all of the effects of hypnosis could be explained in 
terms of the subject’s attitudes and motivations, without resort to any 
sort of special process or trance-like state. Later, he expanded his view 
to include the subject’s expectations (Barber, Spanos and Chaves, 
1974), but the thrust of his theory continued to be that hypnosis was 
the product of perfectly normal psychological processes. Later, Barber 
(1999) conceded that hypnosis might be an ASC after all, at least 
when it occurs in highly hypnotizable subjects. Similarly, Sarbin 
(Sarbin and Andersen, 1967) offered an explanation of hypnosis in 
terms of sociological role theory — essentially, that the hypnotized 
subjects were enacting a socially prescribed role, behaving as they 
believe hypnotized subjects should behave. But later, Sarbin and Coe 
(1972) allowed that, sometimes, subjects become so involved in the 
proceedings that they do not realize that they are enacting a role — 
which would seem to indicate that they are in some kind of ASC after 
all. 
Other ‘non-state’ approaches to hypnosis have relied on various 
social-cognitive constructs, without resort to notions of an ASC (for 
an overview, see Lynn, Kirsch and Hallquist, 2008). Spanos (1986) 
drew on both Barber’s and Sarbin’s earlier work to emphasize sub-
jects’ motivation to display behaviour regarded as characteristically 
hypnotic, as well as the features of the social context that influence 
both these displays and their tendency to attribute these effects to the 
suggestions of the hypnotist, rather than to their own voluntary 
responses. Kirsch (1991), for his part, drew on social learning theory 
to argue that, given appropriately positive expectancies, subjects’ 
responses to hypnotic suggestions take the form of self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Hypnosis, then, is analogous to a placebo, which has no 
active ingredient beyond the subjects’ belief that the pill will have its 
intended effects. Similarly, Lynn (Lynn and Rhue, 1991) argued that, 
given the appropriate response set, subjects responded automatically 
to the hypnotist’s suggestions, and that certain features of the hypnotic 
context discourage subjects from becoming aware of the personal and 
situational factors that influence their responses. Although lack of 
awareness and control would ordinarily be the sort of features we 
would ascribe to an ASC, Lynn, like Kirsch, emphasizes that auto-
maticity is a common feature of normal behaviour, and so it is not 
necessary to postulate an ASC to explain their occurrence in hypnosis. 
On occasion, the ‘altered state’ debate seems to be a local mani-
festation of a long-standing conflict over whether ‘mentalistic entities’ 
like consciousness have any place in a scientific explanation of 
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experience, thought, and action. And sometimes, the ‘non-state’ view 
appears to be a cover for a debunking attitude which claims, for 
example, that subjects reporting hypnotic deafness still hear perfectly 
well (Spanos, Jones and Malfara, 1982), that post-hypnotic amnesia is 
not genuine forgetting (Coe, 1978), or that the failure to counteract 
hypnotic suggestions is a strategy for convincing the hypnotist that 
subjects are deeply hypnotized (Spanos, Cobb and Gorassini, 1985). 
But to the extent that ‘non-state’ theorists agree (or concede) that sub-
jects’ responses to hypnotic suggestions are subjectively compelling, 
that would seem to resolve the question: hypnosis is an ASC. 
3. Defining an ASC 
Defining an altered state of consciousness has proven as difficult as 
defining consciousness itself (e.g. Ludwig, 1966; Revonsuo, Kallio 
and Sikka, 2009). In one influential attempt, Stoyva and Kamiya 
(1968) defined an ASC as a hypothetical construct, which may be 
inferred from a network of relationships among variables that are 
directly observable. Employing the logic of converging operations, 
they argued that an ASC can be identified with respect to four facets: 
an induction procedure, alterations in subjective experience, 
associated changes in overt behaviour, and physiological correlates 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Venn diagram showing the convergence of four characteristic 
features on an altered state of consciousness (ASC). 
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Ideally, every ASC would have a unique set of features in each of 
these respects. However, given what we know about the structure of 
concepts and categories, it is better to treat ASCs as natural concepts, 
represented by a prototype or one or more exemplars, each consisting 
of features that are only probabilistically associated with category 
membership, with no clear boundaries between one altered state and 
another, or between altered and normal consciousness (Kihlstrom, 
1984). 
3.1. Induction 
Operationally, an ASC can be defined simply as the output resulting 
from a particular input — which is to say, by the means employed to 
induce it. One induces a psychedelic state by ingesting a tab of LSD; 
one begins meditating by adopting the lotus position; one goes to 
sleep by climbing into bed, pulling up the covers, and turning off the 
lights. Hypnosis is typically induced by verbal suggestions for relaxa-
tion, eye fixation, focused attention, and eye closure — although other 
techniques are also employed (Edmonston, 1986). But none of these 
elements is necessary: for example, subjects can be hypnotized while 
pedalling vigorously on a bicycle ergometer. Nor are they sufficient: 
there are wide individual differences in hypnotizability (Hilgard, 
1965), and highly hypnotizable subjects may need little or nothing by 
way of an induction procedure. Nevertheless, a formal induction pro-
cedure helps to define the situation as hypnosis, as opposed to some-
thing else, so that subjects have some sense of what is going to happen 
and what they should do. 
3.2. Subjective Experience 
Regardless of whether there has been a formal induction procedure, 
there is no point in talking about an ASC unless the subject actually 
experiences subjectively compelling changes in the monitoring or con-
trolling functions of consciousness, as instigated by the hypnotist’s 
suggestions. Here it should be noted that there are some forms of 
hypnosis which do not entail suggestions of this sort. For example, 
‘neutral’ hypnosis, a concept that has its origins with Pavlov, is 
defined as the subject’s state following the induction procedure, but 
before any specific suggestions have been given (Edmonston, 1981; 
1986). And while there are forms of self-hypnosis in which subjects 
give suggestions to themselves (Johnson et al., 1983; Shor and Easton, 
1973), there are other forms in which subjects construct their own 
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free-flowing reveries without any suggestions for specific experiences 
(Fromm et al., 1981; for comparisons, see Orne and McConkey, 
1981). Still, it has to be said that the most dramatic alterations in con-
sciousness occur in response to specific suggestions for analgesia, 
age-regression, amnesia, and the like. For this reason, introspective 
self-reports of changes in subjective experience are critical to the 
definition of any ASC. 
Some ‘non-state’ theorists have objected to even these phenomena 
as ASCs, on the grounds that they can be explained in terms of ordi-
nary behavioural processes, without invoking an ASC. For example, 
Barber (1969) claimed that non-hypnotic instructions intended to 
enhance subjects’ task-motivation could produce the same effects as 
hypnotic suggestions. However, these instructions put strong pressure 
on subjects for behavioural compliance, in the absence of subjectively 
compelling experiential changes. Demands for honesty essentially 
eliminate reports of auditory and visual hallucinations by task-
motivated subjects, but have little effect on those made by hypnotic 
subjects, indicating that the reports of task-motivated subjects are not 
accompanied by the subjective conviction characteristic of those who 
have been hypnotized (Bowers, 1967; Ruch, Morgan and Hilgard, 
1974). 
Similarly, Spanos (1986) hypothesized that hypnotic analgesia was 
accomplished via ordinary coping and stress-inoculation mechanisms, 
such as distraction, relaxation, imagining situations incompatible with 
pain, and avoidance of catastrophizing. However, a series of head-to-
head comparisons by Bowers and his associates revealed important 
differences between the two conditions (Hargadon, Bowers and 
Woody, 1995; Miller and Bowers, 1986; 1993). For example, the 
success of hypnotic analgesia was correlated with hypnotizability, 
while the success of the non-hypnotic coping mechanisms was not. 
Subjects in the stress-inoculation condition reported actively using the 
various coping strategies, while those in the hypnosis condition did 
not. The coping strategies, but not hypnotic analgesia, interfered with 
performance on a competing, attention-demanding task. And the 
deliberate use of counter-pain imagery had no effect on the success of 
hypnotic suggestions for analgesia. Taken together, these results 
appear to indicate that hypnotic analgesia is not mediated by stress 
inoculation and other consciously deployed coping strategies. 
A similar story can be told about the effects of hypnosis on memory. 
Spanos (1986) hypothesized that hypnotic and post-hypnotic amnesia 
was produced by the conscious deployment of cognitive strategies 
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similar to those employed in directed forgetting or ‘thought 
suppression’, such as self-distraction, relaxation, and imagining a 
situation in which one cannot remember something. However, there 
are important differences between directed forgetting and post-
hypnotic amnesia (Basden et al., 1994; Coe et al., 1989; Davidson and 
Bowers, 1991; Kihlstrom, 1983; Kihlstrom and Barnhardt, 1993). For 
example, post-hypnotic amnesia is reversible, while directed 
forgetting is not, suggesting that the former impairs retrieval while the 
latter impairs encoding. Post-hypnotic amnesia most closely resembles 
a variant of directed forgetting known as ‘cuing by item sets’ — 
which, unlike post-hypnotic amnesia, is not particularly effective in 
disrupting retrieval. Directed forgetting instructions are typically 
given after only a single study trial, while post-hypnotic amnesia is 
effective even with overlearned material. Directed forgetting is 
associated with the release of proactive inhibition, whereas post-
hypnotic amnesia has no effect on retroactive interference. Directed 
forgetting and post-hypnotic amnesia appear to be positively correla-
ted (Geiselman, Bjork and Fishman, 1983), but — as in Bowers’ 
studies of analgesia — post-hypnotic amnesia is correlated with 
hypnotizability while directed forgetting is not (Coe et al., 1989). 
Hypnotic suggestions not to think about some topic, which would 
seem to invoke precisely the process hypothesized by Spanos, do not 
give rise to the ‘ironic rebound’ associated with non-hypnotic 
instructions for thought suppression (Bowers and Woody, 1996). 
3.3. Behavioural Correlates 
Self-reports have always made psychologists nervous, even in the hey-
day of introspectionism (Boring, 1953). Accordingly, another (more 
salutary) residue of behaviourism is a methodological choice to focus 
on overt behaviour as a window onto the mind. Observable behaviour 
serves as the basis for objective scoring of the standardized scales 
developed for measuring individual differences in hypnotizability 
(Hilgard, 1965; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prevost and duChene, 2008; 
Woody and Barnier, 2008). Given the suggestion that an outstretched 
arm is holding a heavy ball, for example, the hand and arm must fall a 
specified amount within a specified interval of time. Following the 
suggestion that a fly is buzzing around the subjects’ heads, they must 
make some overt gesture to brush it away. Note, however, that this 
overt behaviour is a consequence of the subject’s altered subjective 
experience, and is of no interest in its absence. If the hand does not 
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feel as if it is holding a bowling ball, the fact that the subject 
eventually lowers it is simply a matter of behavioural compliance. For 
this reason, behavioural scores obtained under strong demands for 
compliance must be corrected downwards by instructions for honesty 
in reporting — that is, by self-reports (Bates, 1992; Bowers, 1967; 
Ruch, Morgan and Hilgard, 1974; Spanos and Barber, 1968). 
Not only does the outstretched hand feel heavy, it also feels as if it 
is falling by itself. Most behavioural responses to hypnotic suggestions 
are accompanied by the experience of involuntariness: it appears as if 
the suggested effect is happening by itself, and is not the result of 
deliberate effort. This classic suggestion effect (Weitzenhoffer, 1974; 
1980b) or non-conscious involvement (Shor, 1962; 1979) 
distinguishes hypnotic experience from behavioural compliance. 
Weitzenhoffer, who drew attention to the importance of the classic 
suggestion effect in hypnosis, worried that strictly behavioural assess-
ments of hypnotic response could be distorted by behavioural com-
pliance (Weitzenhoffer, 1980a). It is true that purely behavioural 
assessments of response to suggestions are sometimes dramatically 
corrected downwards by considerations of honesty in reporting, sub-
jective success, or experienced involuntariness (Bates and Kraft, 1991; 
Spanos et al., 1983). But this is not as serious a problem for the 
Stanford or Harvard scales of hypnotizability: on average, subjects 
report that their positive responses are experienced as involuntary 
about 80% of the time (Bowers, 1981; 1982; Bowers, Laurence and 
Hart, 1988; Farthing, Brown and Venturino, 1983; Hilgard, 1981). 
Subjects going through these traditional procedures understand that 
they are to let a response happen if it is happening, but not to push a 
response that is not. Accordingly, most behavioural responses to 
hypnotic suggestions appear to be experienced as subjectively con-
vincing and involuntary. Still, because there are differences in the 
experience of involuntariness even among highly hypnotizable sub-
jects (Terhune, Cardena and Lindgren, 2011; Terhune et al., 2016), it 
cannot hurt to make sure this is the case, and correct subjects’ scores 
as necessary. 
Although hypnotic suggestions may appear to be executed auto-
matically and involuntarily, they do not generally meet the traditional 
operational definition of automaticity: inevitable evocation, incorri-
gible completion, effortless execution, and parallel processing (e.g. 
Tobis and Kihlstrom, 2010; for more complete documentation, see 
Kihlstrom, 2007; 2008a). What is important is that hypnotic 
phenomena are experienced as involuntary — just as it is important 
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that behavioural responses are accompanied by subjective conviction, 
honestly reported. Behavioural responses to hypnotic suggestions are 
of no interest except as expressions of genuine changes in subjective 
experience. Self-reports correct behavioural responses to hypnotic 
suggestions, not the other way around. Overt behaviour, to paraphrase 
the 1928 Book of Common Prayer (not to mention St. Augustine), is 
an outward and visible sign of an inward and invisible state. There 
really is no way to avoid self-reports of subjective experience; the 
methodological trick is to collect them under circumstances where 
subjects believe it is legitimate for them to reflect accurately on their 
experiences (Orne, 1962; 1973). 
3.4. Physiological Correlates 
Because both self-reports and overt behaviours are subject to dis-
tortion by compliance and other social-influence processes, hypnosis 
researchers have long been interested in psychophysiological indices 
that are, ostensibly at least, not under voluntary control. A number of 
such proposals have been made over the years, dating back at least to 
Pavlov’s idea that hypnosis is a state of general cortical inhibition. 
Many of these early ideas, like Pavlov’s, proved to be contaminated 
by variables such as relaxation which are not intrinsic to hypnosis. 
The advent of powerful brain imaging technologies has led to a 
renewed effort to identify reliable neural correlates of hypnosis (Del 
Casale et al., 2012; Halligan and Oakley, 2013; Kihlstrom, 2013; 
Landry and Raz, 2015; Oakley and Halligan, 2009; 2013).  
One proposal is that hypnosis decreases activity in the ‘default mode 
network’ (DMN) in the brain, along with increased activity in the 
frontoparietal ‘attention network’ (Deeley et al., 2012; Demertzi et al., 
2011; McGeown et al., 2009). However, this pattern is unlikely to be 
specific to hypnosis. The DMN is active when subjects are not 
engaged in any task-specific mental activity (instead, they might be 
engaged in mind-wandering or simple daydreaming), and the 
induction of hypnosis typically begins with instructions for focused 
attention. It is not surprising that, once the hypnotic induction pro-
cedure begins, subjects cease daydreaming or mind-wandering and 
start paying attention to the hypnotist, but it is not at all clear that this 
shift in brain activity is a unique signature of hypnosis. The same sorts 
of shifts also occur in meditation (McGeown, 2016) — and, indeed, 
might occur in any situation where subjects settle down to focus on 
whatever task is at hand. 
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Alternatively, Woody and his colleagues have proposed that hypno-
sis entails alterations in the frontal-lobe brain systems which control 
voluntary behaviour, resulting in a decoupling of the monitoring and 
controlling functions of consciousness (Parris, 2017; Woody and 
Bowers, 1994; Woody and Szechtman, 2003). As a result, subjects can 
respond to various hypnotic suggestions by actively imagining the 
suggested situation — a heavy object pulling their hands and arms 
down, for example, or a fly buzzing annoyingly around their heads — 
without being aware of their own deliberate mental activities. These 
imaginative activities, in turn, generate corresponding behavioural 
responses through ideomotor action. In this way, voluntary, attention-
demanding responses to hypnotic suggestions would be experienced 
as both subjectively compelling and involuntary (Kihlstrom, 1992a). 
Although many studies of the physiological correlates of hypnosis 
have focused on ‘neutral’ hypnosis, that is not where the ‘action’ in 
hypnosis is likely to reside. Close your eyes: that is what it is like to 
be in ‘neutral’ hypnosis. Hypnosis counts as an ASC when subjects 
respond positively to suggestions for analgesia, age-regression, 
amnesia, and the like. And because subjects can have a wide variety of 
experiences while they are hypnotized, it is probably a mistake to 
expect that there would be any neurophysiological correlates of 
hypnosis in general. Accordingly, investigators who are interested in 
the neural correlates of hypnosis are more likely to find something 
interesting when they focus on the correlates of specific hypnotic 
suggestions. And, in fact, brain imaging studies have identified 
specific changes in brain activity corresponding to hypnotic paralysis 
(Halligan et al., 2000), auditory and visual hallucinations (Szechtman 
et al., 1998; Kosslyn et al., 2000; McGeown et al., 2012), analgesia 
(Rainville et al., 2002), agnosia (Raz, Fan and Posner, 2005), and 
amnesia (Mendelsohn et al., 2008). The studies cited are just 
examples: for a more comprehensive listing, see Landry and Raz 
(2015). Note, however, that even these neural changes may not be 
unique to hypnosis. In a study of hypnotically induced colour blind-
ness, for example, hypnotized subjects received a suggestion to 
perceive a grayscale stimulus as coloured, and a coloured stimulus in 
grayscale (Kosslyn et al., 2000). Positive response to these 
suggestions was associated with changes in the ‘colour area’ (V4) of 
the occipital cortex, but these changes were the same as those 
observed when unhypnotized control subjects perceived coloured or 
grayscale stimuli, or when they simply imagined the stimuli as such. 
The brain changed with the experience, but the origins of the 
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experience — whether in stimulation, hypnotic suggestion, or vivid 
imagination — did not much matter. Such findings may testify to the 
‘reality’ of the suggested experience, but it is not clear that they can 
tell us, for sure, whether subjects are hypnotized; they may have been 
imagining rather than hallucinating, or they may have been simulating 
hypnosis. 
Oakley and Halligan (2010) and Mazzoni et al. (2013) have pro-
posed a general framework for studying the neurophysiological correl-
ates of hypnosis and hypnotic suggestions. This is an expanded 
‘Noah’s Ark’ (2x2x2) design crossing two levels of hypnotizability 
(low vs. high) with two levels of hypnosis (induction or no induction) 
and two levels of suggestion (suggestion or no suggestion). Such a 
design permits the separate evaluation of the neural correlates of 
hypnotizability, ‘neutral’ hypnosis, specific suggestions, and all their 
interactions — three two-way and one three-way. McGeown et al. 
(2012) implemented such a design in the context of suggestions for 
colour blindness and colour hallucination (see also, Mazzoni et al., 
2013). As studies like this accumulate, we may well find out which 
changes in brain activity are associated with the induction of hypnosis, 
and thus common across various hypnotic suggestions, and which are 
unique to the particular experiences that subjects are having. 
To some extent, the search for neural correlates of hypnosis is 
inspired by the success of psychophysiological indices such as EEG 
and EOG in identifying the stages of sleep, or suggesting when a 
subject might be dreaming. But observations of brain and other 
physiological activity cannot be substituted for self-reports: at the very 
least, that would entail substituting a correlate for the criterion against 
which it has been validated. Cognitive neuroscientists generally 
caution against engaging in reverse inference, such as identifying 
particular mental states based on neuroimaging data, as an example of 
the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (Poldrack, 2011). In 
any event, physiological indices have no privileged status in psychol-
ogy, and the lack of specific neural correlates does not in and of itself 
argue against the classification of hypnosis as an ASC. 
4. Hypnosis and Dissociation 
Setting aside the issue of how ASCs can be defined in general, how 
can we characterize the alterations in consciousness observed in 
hypnosis? In general, the phenomena which comprise the domain of 
hypnosis appear to entail divisions in consciousness affecting 
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percepts, memories, and other mental contents, which continue to 
influence behaviour subconsciously, outside of phenomenal awareness 
(for more complete documentation, see Bowers and Davidson, 1991; 
Kihlstrom, 1984; 1998; 2007; 2008b). This situation is epitomized by 
dissociations between explicit and implicit memory — changes in 
experience, thought, and action attributable to prior experience which 
occur in the absence of conscious recollection of that experience 
(Kihlstrom, Dorfman and Park, 2017; Schacter, 1987). To take the 
most thoroughly investigated example, post-hypnotic amnesia affects 
recall, recognition, and other aspects of explicit memory, but spares 
repetition and semantic priming effects, as well as other manifesta-
tions of implicit memory, such as retroactive and proactive inter-
ference effects, savings in relearning, source amnesia, and procedural 
learning. When responses to post-hypnotic suggestions are accom-
panied by post-hypnotic amnesia, as is typical, that too counts as a 
dissociation between explicit and implicit memory (Kihlstrom, 1997). 
By analogy with implicit memory, the implicit–explicit distinction 
can be extended to other cognitive domains (Kihlstrom, 2012). For 
example, implicit perception is reflected in any change in experience, 
thought, and action attributable to a stimulus in the current environ-
ment (as opposed to a past event), in the absence of conscious per-
ception of that stimulus (Kihlstrom, Barnhardt and Tataryn, 1992). 
And as with implicit memory, dissociations between explicit and 
implicit perception can be observed in hypnosis. For example, 
semantic priming is preserved in subjects who have been shown 
homophones plus disambiguating context words during hypnotic 
blindness, and thus did not consciously perceive the words (Bryant 
and McConkey, 1989). Implicit expressions of perception can be seen 
in other ways as well. Hypnotic analgesia, for example, does not 
abolish physiological responses to painful stimuli (Hilgard and 
Morgan, 1975); hypnotic deafness does not reduce speech dys-
fluencies created by delayed auditory feedback (Spanos, Jones and 
Malfara, 1982); priming enables subjects experiencing hypnotic 
anaesthesia to detect tactile stimuli at better than chance levels, even 
though they cannot consciously feel them (Tataryn and Kihlstrom, 
2017). Hilgard’s ‘hidden observer’, observed in hypnotic analgesia 
and deafness (Hilgard, Morgan and Macdonald, 1975), and Orne’s 
‘trance logic’ observed in age-regression and hypnotic hallucinations 
(Orne, 1959), also reflect this fundamental division in consciousness 
— showing that, whatever the subject’s conscious experience, the 
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actual stimulus state of affairs is also being processed, albeit outside 
of awareness. 
The fact that dissociations between explicit and implicit memory, 
perception, and the like occur in other conditions, and even in subjects 
tested in the normal waking state, does not vitiate their status as 
reflections of altered consciousness in hypnosis. In accordance with 
the hypnotist’s suggestions, hypnotized subjects perceive objects that 
are not present in the environment, and remember things that did not 
happen in the past. They also fail to perceive and remember objects 
and events that are present, and events that did happen. Nevertheless, 
the objectively true state of affairs continues to influence their experi-
ence, thought, and action. Other states involve different alterations in 
consciousness; but this is what it is like to be hypnotized. 
5. ‘State’ as Category 
It has been suggested that the ‘altered state debate’ has been some-
thing of a distraction for researchers and clinicians interested in 
hypnosis (Jensen et al., 2017; Terhune et al., 2017). On the other 
hand, it’s not clear how much of a distraction it has actually been. If 
we date the beginnings of modern hypnosis research to the initial 
publication of the Stanford scales in 1959, according to the PsycInfo 
database there were 8,651 publications through 2017 with ‘hypnosis’ 
in the abstract, but the phrase ‘altered state’ appeared in only 142 of 
these (1.64%). There has been plenty of time and effort devoted to 
understanding the mechanisms underlying various hypnotic phenom-
ena, the structure of hypnotizability, and the usefulness of hypnosis in 
medicine and psychotherapy. 
The debate over hypnosis as an ASC has often been confused about 
how to think about the concept of state itself. In this respect, Hilgard 
carefully distinguished between ‘states as causes’ and ‘states as 
categories’ (Hilgard, 1969, p. 75). He doubted that hypnosis qualified 
as a state in the former sense, not least because all phenomena elicited 
in hypnosis can also be elicited post-hypnotically, and promoted the 
latter view — most clearly in a later paper marking out ‘the domain of 
hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1973a). That domain includes suggestions for 
various kinds of non-veridical experiences, responding to which often 
entails a division in consciousness evidenced by dissociations between 
explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) expressions of 
memory and perception. Hypnosis does not cause these alterations in 
consciousness to occur, nor does it explain them; but it is character-
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ized by them. As such, it seems reasonable to refer to hypnosis itself 
as an ASC — a state defined by a typical induction procedure and 
subjective experiences, concomitant behavioural responses, and, 
perhaps, a characteristic neurophysiological signature as well. 
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